



‘They’ll Never Understand Why I’m Here’: British Marxism and the Irish Revolution, 1916-1923 
 
The Irish Revolution of 1916-23 lies perhaps second in importance only to the Great Famine 
as an event—or related series of events—which would not so much shape as transform the 
course of modern Irish history thereafter. Beginning with the Easter Rising in 1916 and 
culminating in the Irish Civil War of 1922-23, it was a revolution that was characterised by 
an explosive republican challenge to British rule and astonishing levels of labour militancy, 
but one, ultimately, that resulted in the creation of two conservative Irish states and the 
thwarting of Irish republican and socialist ambitions. Not surprisingly, it is a period that has 
long fascinated and divided historians, but which is also currently subject to unprecedented 
popular interest, as the so called ‘Decade of Commemoration’ moves into full swing.  
 
The relationship between British social democracy and the Irish Revolution has been 
examined.1 But an area that remains relatively under-researched has been the connection 
between British revolutionary socialists and Irish revolutionaries.  Although often referred to 
in passing in examinations of the Irish Revolution,2 or the British socialist movement,3 it has 
rarely been the main focus of study itself. The main exceptions here are David Reed’s 1984 
work, Ireland: the Key to the British Revolution and Geoffrey Bell’s recent Hesitant 
Comrades: The British Labour Movement and the Irish Revolution. Reed devoted a chapter 
to the 1916-1921 period. Here, a contrast was made between the ‘social democratic wing’ 
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of the labour movement, which included the ILP and Labour Party, who, in Reed’s view, ‘did 
not support the struggle of the Irish people for a democratic republic’ and the 
revolutionaries in organisations such as the Workers Socialist Federation (WSF) and, later, 
the Communist Party of Great Britain, (CPGB) who ‘consistently’ did support it, but were too 
weak to affect the outcome. Although criticised for focusing too much on the question of 
affiliation to the Labour Party during this period, the CPGB was singled out for praise by 
Reed for recognising the imperialist nature of the Treaty settlement in December 1921 and 
opposing it. 4 
 
Bell’s excellent monograph began life as a PhD and also covers the period up to the Treaty in 
December 1921.  The focus here is more on the Labour Party and trade unions, as well as 
the ILP. But the Marxist organisations are not ignored, and there is occasional, partial 
coverage of their input, which, like Reed’s account, is based mainly on a review of their 
publications.  Bell is also critical of the ideological shortcomings of the mainstream British 
labour movement organisations, and their failure to support or involve themselves in the 
campaign for full republican independence. The revolutionary socialist organisations are 
also subjected to criticism on these grounds, but in a milder fashion. And like Reed, Bell 
concludes his investigation by praising the CPGB, for its analysis of the Treaty, seeing it as 
their ‘finest theoretic hour’.5 
 
Perhaps what remains under-represented in the literature is an analysis that focuses more 
squarely and directly on the Marxist organisations; one that examines not only their 
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pronouncements and their publications, but also some of their actions; one that looks at the 
inter-play between British and Irish revolutionaries; and, crucially, one that does not stop in 
December 1921, but which continues into the Civil War period. This paper is a contribution 
in this direction. It is intended to examine the input of British-based Marxist revolutionary 
organisations into the Irish Revolution, up to and including the Civil War. The focus will be 
placed on the Socialist Labour Party, (SLP) the British Socialist Party (BSP) and the CPGB 
which were the main Marxist organisations in British politics at that point.  
 
Roots and context 
Ireland had long been of interest to radical political activists in Britain. From the example of 
the famous Leveller, William Walwyn,6 to the Scottish radical, Thomas Muir, who made 
connections with the United Irishmen in 1793, 7  the long struggle of the Irish for self-
determination and freedom was viewed as important.  As political exiles in 19th century 
London, both Marx and Engels devoted time to analysis and political activism in support of 
Irish revolutionaries. Their view on the sequencing of revolutionary change in Ireland and 
Britain altered after the Great Famine but throughout their long years of political activism, 
the guiding principle of their work was consistent and two-fold: firstly, the support they 
offered for Irish independence was based not merely on sympathy, and a desire to assist the 
liberation of the ‘earliest English colony’  from the ‘iron hand’ of a ‘parasitic’ oppressor 8 but 
a deep analysis of the economic relationship between the two countries. From the 1860s 
onwards, Marx increasingly viewed Ireland as the key to revolution in Britain, arguing that 
the destruction of the power of ‘landed English oligarchy’ in Ireland would erode its strength 
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in Britain, and was the ‘prime condition’ of British working class emancipation.9  Secondly, 
both recognised the autonomy of Irish organisations and opposed attempts by British 
socialists to control them. The best example of this was Engels’ excoriation of Hales, a 
leading English member of the International, who had objected to separate Irish branches of 
the organisation in Britain, arguing that it was at odds with the ‘fundamental principle’ of 
the association, ‘which was to destroy all semblance of the nationalist doctrine and remove 
all barriers that separated man from man’. For Engels, asking the Irish, a ‘conquered people’ 
to forget their nationality and ‘submit to the conquerors’ was ‘not internationalism, but 
simply prating submission’.10 
 
These principles of identifying a material basis for support of Irish independence and full 
respect for the independence of Irish organisations were something of a legacy that Marx 
and Engels bequeathed to British socialists, but, as will be discussed below, would not 
always guide their actions during the revolutionary era, an era that would open with the 
Easter Rising of 1916.  
 
James Connolly, the Easter Rising and the British Socialist movement 
It is appropriate that a discussion on the relationship between the Irish and British socialists 
during the Irish Revolution should begin with James Connolly. Born in Edinburgh in 1868 to 
Irish immigrant parents, Connolly was recruited to the socialist movement by John Leslie, 
secretary of the Edinburgh-based Scottish Socialist Federation. Leslie, twelve years older 
than Connolly, and also the child of Irish immigrants, had himself a long standing interest in 
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Ireland. In 1894, he published a series of articles in the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) 
newspaper, Justice, where he sketched out a materialist analysis of Irish history under the 
Union.11 Connolly’s own classic challenge to bourgeois nationalist historiography, Labour in 
Irish History, was clearly inspired to some degree by this work, and it was Leslie who also 
encouraged the younger man to move to Dublin in 1896, to take up the position of organiser 
for the Dublin Socialist Society, later renamed the Irish Socialist Republican Party (ISRP). 
Connolly’s political focus from that point onwards was riveted on Ireland. He wrote 
prolifically on the relationship between Irish nationalism and socialism, arguing that only 
through the destruction of British capitalist-imperialism in Ireland could genuine 
independence be achieved. Only the ‘incorruptible’ Irish working class could lead this 
struggle, as the middle-classes were bound to British capitalism by a ‘thousand economic 
strings’. 12Connolly also maintained regular contact with British socialists in the form of 
letters, articles, speaking tours and even the establishment of some British-based ISRP 
branches.   It would be during one of these tours that Connolly would assist his Scottish 
comrades who had split from the SDF, acting for a short spell as the first chairman of their 
new organisation, the SLP.13 
    From August 1914 onwards, James Connolly was of course committed to the idea of a 
Rising against British rule in Ireland.  He believed that a decaying British imperialism could 
stave off its decline by defeating Germany and that if this happened, Ireland might be held 
in its grip and repressed for another generation, with the hard-fought rights and liberties of 
Irish workers being destroyed in the process. 14 It was as a result of this particular 
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perspective that Connolly became convinced of the need to strike while the opportunity 
afforded by the war was still present. Both Kendall and Challinor indicate that his former 
associates in the SLP were either involved in or knew about the ‘preliminaries’ for the Easter 
Rising, 15but there is no evidence that this was the case. Indeed, given the secretive nature 
of the planning and the somewhat negative public attitude the SLP would later display 
about the Rising, it is almost certainly the case that they were not.    
 
Connolly had maintained contact with the SLP, despite the strain in relations caused by his 
public rupture with US SLP leader and theoretician, Daniel de Leon. He had a regular 
correspondence with J.C. Matheson and, in later years, Arthur McManus, who by the 
outbreak of the First World War had become a leading figure within the SLP and editor of 
the party newspaper, the Socialist. In 1915, McManus had published Connolly’s Irish 
Worker, following its suppression in Ireland, working ‘night and day to get the paper printed 
and personally escorting it to Dublin, with the journal wrapped up in a parcel marked 
‘glass’.16  The Belfast-born McManus was, like all of the SLP leaders, hugely influenced by 
James Connolly, but this was probably the full extent to which he and the party played in 
assisting the Irish socialist leader during this period. 
 
Clearly, then, the SLP had close links with James Connolly, which had been sustained 
throughout many years of activity. But in the aftermath of the Rising, the party adopted a 
policy of silence.  No support was offered to the republicans and no criticism was made of 
the government. There was no attempt to understand or analyse the reasons for Connolly’s 
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participation.  At first glance, this seems odd, especially when it is considered that McManus 
did have some insight into Connolly’s thoughts and actions. In November 1915 and January 
1916, Connolly had written to the SLP leader, commenting on how the ‘high handedness’ 
and ‘ruthlessness’ of the British state was pushing Ireland to the point of ‘social 
revolution’.17  Most remarkably of all, there was no obituary of Connolly in the pages of the 
Socialist - in fact, no mention of his execution at all in the pages of the party he had helped 
to establish. And in the period following the Rising, the SLP would continue to say very little 
about Ireland.  In the June edition of the Socialist, the party contented itself with the rather 
banal observation:  ‘leaving the merits or demerits of the revolt aside, it will now be realised 
that armies are the force used by capitalists to maintain their undisputed sway.’18  
 
 Harry McShane, then a member of the BSP in Glasgow, recollected in his memoirs that the 
SLP was ‘completely split’ by the Rising, and that while their ‘best comrades’ supported it, 
many others within the party who continued to hold to a syndicalist perspective did not 
‘because it was not based on industry.’ 19 Certainly, the SLP was heavily influenced by 
industrial unionism and was yet to fully shake off its sectarian approach to other socialist 
organisations who did not subscribe to this model of revolutionary change. But the puzzle 
continues over why an apparently divided party could be so united in its silence on such an 
issue—especially if some of its leaders were in favour of it. The only conclusion to be drawn 
is that the SLP remained quiet on the Rising, because no section of the party either 
understood or supported it. It possibly appeared to them as a purely nationalist rebellion 
and so far removed from what they regarded as ‘normal’ socialist political activity, that it 
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could not be supported.  But at the same time, the party clearly did not want to publicly 
condemn the executed Connolly, hence the policy of silence. 
This attitude of the SLP highlights some of the theoretical problems nationalism had posed 
for Marxists at this point. Although Marx and Engels had written a substantial amount about 
Ireland and supported Irish independence, no general principles had been established on 
the relationship between nationalism and socialism within or without colonial states. By the 
time of the Easter Rising, some important developments had occurred. In 1903, the Russian 
Social Democratic and Labour Party had inserted a clause in its programme which granted a 
right of self-determination to those oppressed nationalities locked within the Tsarist state.  
However, this measure had provoked debates between some of the Bolsheviks who 
defended the clause, and those Polish Marxists who opposed it. The most significant of 
these was the debate involving Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, which fully opened up several 
years later. Lenin considered the clause to be a measure that would weaken the power of 
reactionary ‘Great Russian’ chauvinism and assist the building of ‘an alliance of all 
proletarians of all nations on an equal footing’. 20  Interestingly, he drew on Marx and 
Engels’ writings on Ireland to strengthen this argument, considering their work a ‘splendid 
example of the attitude the proletariat of the oppressor nations should have towards 
national movements’. 21  However, Luxemburg theorised that national independence served 
no useful purpose, being a retrograde step for industrial development in a Polish economy 
that had become fully integrated with its Russian counterpart.22 More fundamentally, it was 
also an impossible demand to accommodate, as nearly every national claim was based on 
and resulted in the economic oppression of another national group, and was a damaging 
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impediment to the necessary growth of international class consciousness. 23 The outbreak of 
war and the collapse of the Second International behind the banners of national patriotism 
and chauvinism stimulated further thinking on the matter. This was captured in Lenin’s 1916 
work, Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism, in which he identified some of the 
negative political consequences of imperialism upon the European working class movement. 
In particular was the connection between the ‘superprofits’ being made by the  bourgeois 
classes through their empires and the reformism of the ‘labour aristocracy’, which Lenin saw  
as the main social prop of capitalist rule in Western Europe and the USA. 24  Imperialism 
would in time prove to be a hugely influential work, forming the basis for major shifts in 
international communist strategy in the post-Russian revolution era. However, all of that lay 
ahead. For now, few international socialists displayed much understanding of the 
importance of the national question in colonial states or the relationship between 
nationalism and socialism in colonial states. As a result not many showed much interest in 
the one national independence rebellion of this period that had a socialist leader, the Easter 
Rising. Lenin was among the small number that did, defending the rebellion as a genuine 
insurrection of a section of the Irish petty bourgeoisie and working class, while regretting 
that it had happened too soon ‘before the European revolt of the proletariat had had time 
to mature’.25 But his was very much a distant voice at this stage  
 
Harry McShane further noted in his memoirs that the Scottish socialist movement more 
generally was also divided by the Rising. He described attending  socialist meetings in 
Ayrshire, where opposition to the Rising was expressed and also how the ILP and its 
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newspaper, Forward—a journal to which Connolly had regularly submitted articles—
condemned the Rising.  McShane maintained that in Glasgow, it was only the BSP which was 
fully behind the Rising.26  This is plausible as the Glasgow BSP had consistently taken a 
principled line against imperialism and the war in particular. Its guiding influence and most 
well-known activist, John Maclean, had just been jailed for his opposition to the war, and 
had in the past visited Ireland for speaking tours.27 Elsewhere, the BSP, which at this stage 
had just suffered a split over its attitude to the war,28 took a line that appeared similar to 
that of the SLP. The new party newspaper, the Call offered coverage of the Rising and its 
impact. But the tone of the commentary was not overly sympathetic. In its 18 May edition, 
the Call noted that the Irish had risen ‘without adequate force’ and ‘like every such Rising’, 
the action had been ‘doomed’. Two weeks later the newspaper also appeared to either 
forget or overlook the principal achievement of Easter Week: the proclamation of the Irish 
Republic. This happened when the paper discussed comments made by Liberal leader, 
Asquith, that both home rule and partition be implemented. Asquith’s suggestions were 
described as ‘doomed to fail’ but apparently only as a result of partition and not because 
Home Rule itself was an inadequate measure.29  
 
The only British socialist organisation which did appear to support the Rising was Sylvia 
Pankhurst’s small Workers’ Socialist Federation.  In the 13 May edition of the Women’s’ 
Dreadnought she described the Rising  as ‘reckless’ but praised it for being ‘undoubtedly 
animated by high ideals’.  The Dreadnought highlighted the egalitarian aspects of the 
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Proclamation and noted its commitment to full male and female suffrage. The party also 
enjoyed something of a coup when one of its members, Patricia Lynch, was able to slip 
through the military cordon in Dublin and report first hand on the aftermath of the Rising. 
Her reports remain valuable today for many reasons—not least for the way that they 
challenge one of the hardy perennials of Irish revisionist historiography-- that the 1916 
rebels lacked support and sympathy from the local population. 30   
 
British Socialists during the Irish War of Independence 
The period after the Rising saw the onset of a revolutionary crisis for the British state in 
Ireland.  Police reports show that as early as June 1916, a growth in support for 
republicanism was already visible. 31 Within 18 months, the Irish Volunteers, soon to be 
known as the Irish Republican Army, (IRA) had been rebuilt and the Irish Parliamentary 
Party’s (IPP) decades-long hegemony within Irish nationalism was unravelling. In April 1918, 
Conscription was defeated following a campaign that was largely led by the labour and trade 
union movement.32 Eight months later Sinn Féin had swept a large majority of Irish seats in 
the British General election and in January 1919 declared a rival Irish Parliament and 
government, Dáil Éireann. This would be followed by a brutal guerrilla war between the IRA 
and the British state. A key dynamic during this entire period was the unprecedented level 
of labour militancy. In 1914, there had been 5900 workers involved in strike action, and a 
total of 290,000 strike days; by 1918, this had risen to 70,8000 workers and over 1.4 million 
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strike days. 33In 1919 alone, there were twelve local general strikes34, including the famous 
Limerick Soviet. 35 From various directions, then, the British writ in Ireland was subject to 
the strongest of challenges. 
 
During this period, Ireland became a far more pressing issue for the British socialists. As well 
as the changes in socialist thinking globally brought about by the Bolshevik revolution, this 
increased concern was a direct response to the escalating violence of the British state and 
its hypocritical flouting of its own supposed democratic principles.  This led to greater 
contact with Irish revolutionaries, some of which were ephemeral, like that between 
Captain Jack White and the BSP in the spring of 1918. White had famously trained the Irish 
Citizen Army and had been jailed for attempting to bring miners in South Wales out on 
strike in protest against the executions in May 1916.36 In April 1918, he appeared on a 
number of BSP platforms, where he urged British socialists to do more to assist the Irish 
revolutionaries, chided them for their weakness and maintained that he had not met more 
than one in a hundred who, when asked to take action in support of Ireland, had not 
responded with the comment ‘what will the government do’?37  White’s connection to the 
BSP was perhaps not significant but his advice to them, and the earlier example he had set 
in 1916 was, as we will see, very much in line with the expectations that the emerging 
centre of world revolution would also have of its British comrades.  
 
                                                          
33 David Fitzpatrick, ‘Strikes in Ireland, 1914-1921, Saothar: Journal of the Irish Labour History Society, 6, 
(Dublin: 1980), p36. 
34 Emmet O’Connor, Syndicalism in Ireland, 1917-1923, (Dublin: 1988), p25. 
35 For more on the Limerick Soviet, see Liam Cahill, Forgotten Revolution: The Limerick Soviet, 1919, (Dublin: 
1991) 
36 White was jailed for three months. See the Daily Mirror, 18 May 1916; Liverpool Echo, 24 May 1916 
37 National Archives (UK) KV 2, 1654, ‘British Socialist Party, Report of Openshaw meeting’, 27 April 1918,  
13 
 
Perhaps the most significant input from a British Marxist organisation in this period came 
from the Socialist Labour Party. The SLP by this stage had become less politically sectarian 
and had also sloughed off its reticence towards the unfolding Irish revolution.  Contacts 
were established with Irish republicans and significant levels of propaganda work were 
being undertaken.  The party was embroiled in a destructive internal crisis over the moves 
towards the formation of a British Communist Party, 38  but clearly viewed Ireland as an 
issue upon which it could distinguish itself from the remainder of the British Left and make 
progress. On 5 February 1920, the Socialist was clear on the connections between the Irish 
struggle and the prospects of revolution in Britain: 
More and more Ireland is proving itself the storm centre of the British isles...Ireland is a powder 
magazine, the explosion of which, if carefully timed and organised in harmony with events in the 
mainland will undoubtedly hoist the shaky fabric of the “glorious” British empire into the air.  
 
One week later, in an article that condemned the British for attempting to provoke another 
‘Easter’ bloodbath, the Socialist again identified a connection between the two struggles:  
Ireland cannot be successful without the mainland of Britain. Our revolutionary success in the 
mainland will be assured by the solid support of the Irish working class. We must redouble our 
efforts on both sides of St George’s Channel. We can neither of us afford to be caught unprepared.39  
 
In addition to this, there were regular references to James Connolly. For example the cover 
of the May Day 1920 edition had a montage of images titled ‘Communists of the Revolution: 
Past and Present’, which included Connolly, Marx and Luxemburg.  Three months later, the 
party NEC passed a special resolution, which noted:  
A subject Ireland is necessary to safeguard the commercial sea-routes of the British Empire...an 
Independent Irish Republic means the first step in the disintegration of the British Empire at its very 
                                                          
38 The SLP had been involved in negotiations with other socialist groups, which had the aim of establishing a 
communist party in Britain. The question of whether a communist party should seek affiliation to the Labour 
Party divided the SLP. The party leadership, including Tom Bell, McManus and Willie Paul were in favour of 
this, but a majority of the membership were opposed. The leadership was eventually expelled and later helped 
form the CPGB. The SLP never fully recovered from this trauma. 
39 Socialist, 12 February 1920 
14 
 
centre...the proclamation and successful establishment of such a Republic would be the signal for a 
united onslaught on British capitalist-imperialism by all of the nations whose necks are under the 
heel of ruthless militarism stretching from India to Ireland.40  
 
The SLP was dismissive of those within the British labour movement who ‘merrily’ passed 
resolutions on Ireland, but did little else to stop the British war machine.41 By way of 
contrast, the party did make some efforts at more direct involvement in the struggle. Close 
links were built with a small clutch of socialists in Belfast, who had split from the ILP and 
organised themselves into the short-lived Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ireland. One 
member of this organisation, Kathleen Coyle, penned an occasional column in the Socialist, 
under the name of ‘Selma Sigerson’ which was far more scathing of Sinn Féin and its ‘neo-
capitalist’ tendencies than most of the offerings from British socialists.42  Three other 
leading figures in this group were John Frederick Hedley, Charles O’Meagher and Simon 
Greenspon. This trio had all been involved in the famous Belfast general strike of January 
1919 and had also been jailed four months later for ‘unlawful assembly’, after organising a 
series of socialist meetings in Belfast.  
 
Hedley is of particular interest to our discussion. Born in Goole in 1884, he had been a 
stoker in the navy but had become a socialist and deserted in 1918, before becoming 
involved in socialist activity in Belfast.  Following his release from jail in the summer of 1919, 
Hedley became active in the SLP in Sheffield but in January 1920 was arrested again under 
the Cat and Mouse act and returned to Crumlin Road prison in Belfast.  In April, he 
embarked on his fourth hunger strike in just 12 months, and was eventually released in 
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May. A ‘Jack’ Hedley defence fund was established during this period by the SLP, with his 
wife contributing updates on his health to the Socialist. Hedley would later become an 
organiser for the ITGWU and play a leading role in at least three of the major workplace 
occupations and soviets that were set up by workers in Munster during 1920-1922.43 In May 
1921, Hedley was sentenced to six months hard labour for making seditious speeches to 
sailors in Portsmouth, following a secret trial that was held under the provisions of the 
Emergency Powers Regulations. 44 
 
In addition to the connections with the Belfast socialists, there were also strong links 
between the SLP and a group of socialist republicans in Dublin, who in 1919 had briefly 
taken over the leadership of Socialist Party of Ireland, (SPI) with a view to affiliating it to the 
newly-established Communist International (Comintern) Most of these socialists had a 
background in Irish republican activism. The group included 1916 veterans Paddy 
Stephenson and James Connolly’s son, Roddy, but the one who would build closest links 
with the SLP was Seán McLoughlin. McLoughlin had played a leading role in the Easter Rising 
and in the post-Rising re-organisation of the Irish Volunteers.45 But he was also a socialist 
and during 1919 made contact with the SLP and began writing letters to the Socialist. During 
1920-1921, McLoughlin spent long periods in Scotland and England, undertaking speaking 
tours that were organised by the SLP. During this time, he joined the SLP and helped 
develop the organisation’s understanding of the Irish Revolution, pushing it to greater 
efforts in support of the republican struggle. McLoughlin later claimed that he had been 
asked by Michael Collins to make contacts with the British Left, in order to secure political 
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support, as well as material support, in the form of arms and money, for the struggle against 
British imperialism.46 His efforts are worthy of consideration, because he was one of the 
very few Marxists who attempted to theorise the relationships both between Irish 
nationalism and socialism and the Irish and British revolutions. In a significant article 
published in the Socialist in February 1920, McLoughlin argued that while all socialists 
needed to support the demand for an Irish republic, they also had to be aware of the 
contradictory class interests locked within the republican struggle. ‘Who is going to rule in 
an Irish Republic’ he asked, ‘that will be the rock upon which Sinn Féin is wrecked’. 
Developing Connolly’s 1916 ‘hold onto your rifles’ instruction to the ICA, McLoughlin 
maintained  that while socialists would assist republicans in the struggle against British 
imperialism, ‘the fight to overthrow British power in Ireland may not be half as bitterly 
contested as the fight between the Irish working class and Irish middle class for control of 
the country’. He concluded by urging socialists to continue the Irish revolution, ‘as the 
Russians had’ beyond ‘the point marked by their exploiters’, towards the workers republic. 
47 Shortly afterwards, in a report sent to the Comintern sub-bureau in Amsterdam,  
McLoughlin analysed closely the various organisations within the Irish independence and 
labour movements, dismissing the Sinn Féin leaders  as ‘people of a bourgeois outlook’ and 
pinning his hopes on the ‘proletarian’ IRA rank-and file, who, he claimed, could be won to a 
position of active support for socialism. 48These tensions between Irish nationalism and 
socialism would be revealed more clearly and explored in more depth by socialists following 
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the signing of the Treaty in December 1921, but McLoughlin’s articles constituted an early 
attempt to grapple with the problem. 
On the relationship between the Irish and British revolutions, McLoughlin argued that the 
Irish struggle was linked to that of the struggle for socialism in Britain, through being 
directed against the same ruling class. But unlike virtually all socialists of that era, 
McLoughlin felt that socialism would be established in Ireland before Britain. He believed 
that this would detonate uprisings throughout the British Empire, which would in turn 
precipitate the destruction of capitalism in Britain itself.  McLoughlin believed that the 
triumph of socialism in Britain would be the only way that an Irish socialist republic could be 
sure of long term survival. As a result of this analysis, he urged Irish and British workers to 
support both Irish independence, and the socialist movements in both countries. 49 
Most of McLoughlin’s political activity in Britain was dedicated to this objective. His 
meetings were held initially in the main cities and towns in Scotland, but spread to the 
North of England and eventually went as far south as Coventry. These gatherings often drew 
huge crowds, sometimes several thousand strong. In his speeches, he continued to make 
the connection between the interests of Irish and British workers and would often warn his 
audiences that the Black and Tans of Ireland today would be the Black and Tans in Scottish 
and English cities tomorrow. McLoughlin’s membership of the SLP would later end in 
acrimony, but forms an important episode in the story of the connections between British 
and Irish revolutionaries in this period.50 
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Many of these SLP meetings in Scotland and England were organised as ‘Hands off Ireland’ 
events. The regular use of this slogan was a clear reference to the successful ‘Hands off 
Russia’ campaign which had been supported by all sections of the British labour movement, 
including some trade union leaders , but which on the ground was driven by communists.51 
The highpoints of the campaign were the stopping of the Jolly George, on 10 May 1920, 
shortly after the Polish invasion of Russia and the mass demonstrations organised by 
hundreds of ‘councils of action’ three months later, which pushed the TUC and Labour Party 
leadership to threaten a general strike.52 Challinor points out how the CPGB (or those who 
would soon form it) effectively excluded the SLP from participation in this organisation, at 
least at leadership level, and that this was another reason behind the party’s more 
concentrated focus on Ireland. 53  
 
But the SLP was not the only grouping involved in Irish solidarity work. Another segment of 
the Scottish Left, organised around John Maclean, also engaged in such activity. As noted 
earlier, Maclean had a long-standing interest in Ireland, first visiting the country in 1907, 
where he took part in a speaking tour in support of the Belfast Dockers who were on strike 
led by Jim Larkin. Maclean also visited Ireland in 1919 for a short speaking tour in the 
summer of 1919, where he shared platforms with Seán McLoughlin, among others.54 
Maclean’s interest in the Irish republican struggle had intensified by this stage. He regarded 
this struggle as constituting a severe crisis for British imperialism and capitalism, but was 
also interested in the way that republicanism and socialism could be blended, and how this 
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might be applied in a Scottish context.55  Maclean held regular ‘Hands off Ireland’ meetings, 
including one at Motherwell in July 1920, which was attended by between 2000-3000 
people, where he and ally James McDougall called for the withdrawal of British troops and 
suggested that the Lanarkshire miners go on strike in support of this demand. 56  Seven 
months later, the Giffnock miners would do just that, stopping for 24 hours ‘in protest 
against British atrocities in Ireland’ and calling on the remainder of the Lanarkshire coalfield 
to do likewise.57 
 
In addition to the meetings, there was also propaganda, including most famously, The Irish 
Tragedy: Scotland’s Disgrace, a 1920 pamphlet that sold around 20,000 copies, and 
represented Maclean’s most detailed analysis of the issue. In this work, Maclean outlined a 
materialist basis for his support for Irish independence and displayed the connections he 
perceived between that struggle, and the struggle for socialism in Britain. Like some within 
the SLP, Maclean regarded the Irish working class as the principal force within the 
revolutionary struggle and argued that a successful Irish independence struggle would be 
the prelude to an Irish socialist republic, which would weaken capitalism everywhere. 
Should Ireland get a Republic the class war will then burst out and be fought till Irish Labour wins... 
This new phase in Irish life ought to be the inciting influence to British Labour...Ireland’s victory is 
obviously the prelude to Labour’s triumph throughout the world.58 
 
Maclean later took aim at those British socialists who could not see the geo-political 
significance of the Irish independence struggle against British imperialism:  
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The Irish situation obviously is the most revolutionary that has ever arisen in British history, but 
unfortunately lads who fancy themselves the only revolutionaries are too stupid or too obsessed 
with some little crochet to see the tight corner the Irish are placing the British in...The Irish Sinn 
Féiners, who make no profession of socialism or communism and who are at best non-socialists, are 
doing more to help Russia and the Revolution than all we professed Marxians in Britain.59 
 
 
The efforts of the SLP in 1920-21 and John Maclean’s BSP and Tramp Trust groups are 
among the most significant made by the British Left during the Irish Revolution. These 
efforts also included involvement by a group of SLP activists in a strike in Dublin, on the 
issue of Jim Larkin’s imprisonment in the USA. 60 But by themselves, they were efforts that 
could not have a mass impact. Not only were these small forces, but they were also in 
decline at this point.  As a result of its crisis over the formation of the CPGB, the SLP was 
struggling to survive and had effectively disappeared by the end of 1922. Maclean, 
brutalised by repeated imprisonment and politically marginalised by the CPGB, eventually 
died aged just 44 in November 1923. The larger organisations of the labour movement of 
course did have far more potential. But here, there was little will to act in such a fashion. 
Shortly after the start of the munitions boycott by Irish trade unionists in May 1920, a 
special TUC conference was organised to discuss Ireland. At this meeting, the Miners 
showed willingness to act by passing a resolution that called for industrial action, in the 
event of the government failing to end both the military occupation of Ireland, and the 
production of war materiel. But this resolution was neutralised by the NUR leader, JH 
Thomas, who ensured that the conference passed another resolution calling for a truce and 
the establishment of an Irish parliament with dominion status—a settlement that no section 
of the Irish revolutionary movement was advocating. Thomas was able to argue that the 
Miners’ resolution would be enacted only if the government failed to move on the NUR 
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proposal. 61 But when it is considered that Thomas had already met with Lloyd George the 
previous month and agreed with him that the munitions boycott was tantamount to a ‘war 
upon the government’, it is clear that he had little intention of supporting strike action, no 
matter that the government did or didn’t do.62 The Socialist in particular, recognised the 
crucial role that the British working class could play in support of the Irish independence 
struggle. 63 It duly criticised Thomas for failing to support the munitions boycott,64 but it 
made little difference; in the period ahead, the British state would be responsible for some 
appalling acts of violence in Ireland,65 but there would be no action against it by the trade 
union leaders.  
 
Partition 
During 1920-1921, the final outcome of the Irish Revolution remained unclear, but there 
were powerful forces within Irish society and the British state threatening to divert it away 
from the type of thoroughgoing social and political transformation envisaged by the more 
radical socialist republicans. A key debate in this respect was that surrounding the possible 
partition of Ireland. The suggestion that some of the Ulster counties be excluded from Home 
Rule had been mooted by the British government in 1913, and would remain central to their 
approach until the eventual creation of Northern Ireland in 1920-21. The crisis threw into 
relief some of the complexities of the Irish national question. It revealed substantial 
opposition to Irish independence from a considerable section of the protestant working 
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class, which in turn would constitute a serious challenge to socialist thinking and practice in 
the period ahead. 
 
James Connolly had written extensively on the threat of partition in 1913-14. His famous 
prediction that partition would generate a ‘carnival of reaction’ was an argument based 
primarily on material, class considerations; he was concerned about the impact the measure 
would have on Irish workers and feared it would ‘destroy’ the ‘oncoming unity of the labour 
movement’.66These class-based fears were accompanied with sharp attacks on what 
Connolly considered to be the phoney nationalism of the IPP who had reluctantly accepted 
the measure, and the cynicism of the Ulster Unionist bourgeoisie, who stood to benefit from 
it.  Connolly remained convinced that the Irish capitalist class was too weak to lead a 
struggle for full national economic and political independence, and that only Irish workers 
could achieve this. But while there was truth in his depiction of the Irish bourgeoisie--no 
section of this class, north or south, was able to lead this struggle to a successful conclusion-
- Connolly never did tease out precisely why its north-eastern component was so supportive 
of the union and so uninterested in economic development elsewhere on the island. Rather 
than probe the connections of this class to British capitalist-imperialism, he appeared to 
regard unionism as based mainly on sectarianism and held out a hope that the exploited 
protestant working class would eventually recognise its true class interests and reject those 
who ‘hide their sweatshops behind Orange flags’.67  Connolly’s ideas and approach would 
provide the framework for most Irish and British socialists in the post 1916 period, in their 
attempts to understand and deal with the issue.  
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Throughout these years, the entire Irish Left would remain hostile to the prospect of 
partition. Even in Belfast, which had a mainly protestant labour and socialist movement, all 
genuine labour and socialist political organisations were opposed to the measure and 
supported the principle of Irish self-government on a 32-county basis.68 The reconstituted 
Belfast Labour Party was the principal socialist organisation in the city and in both the 1918 
general election and 1920 Corporation elections, had successfully stood on such a 
platform.69 Like their Irish counterparts, British Marxist organisations were hostile to the 
possibility of partition and also tended to the view that orangeism and unionism were 
ideological creations of the northern bourgeoisie, constructed to control and dupe the 
protestant working class. The BSP had made clear its objections to unionism and the 
possibility of partition in 1916.  Dismissing protestant religious fears as ‘a bogey largely 
created for political purposes’, the Call described as ‘absurd’ the argument that Ulster was a 
homogenous unit. The newspaper outlined Ulster’s economic importance to the rest of 
Ireland and concluded that partition would be akin to ‘permanently depriving France of the 
territory now occupied by the Germans’.70 
 
Sectarian violence reached exceptionally high levels during this period. In Belfast alone, 453 
people were killed in the 2-year period during July 1920-July 1922. Although they made up 
just 25% of the city’s population, 257 of these victims were Catholics. Around a quarter of 
Belfast’s catholic population also lost their jobs, and 23,000 were forced out of their 
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homes.71  Belfast Labour was also routed, with its North Belfast hall being burned down by 
loyalists and its candidates physically prevented from campaigning in the inaugural 1921 
Northern Ireland parliament elections. This upsurge in political violence was commented 
upon by the British socialist press, but a deeper inability to explain the popularity of 
unionism within protestant society remained evident. Instead, unionism continued to be 
viewed as a ‘yarn’, spun by the industrialists to entrap the protestant working class.  It 
continued to be viewed as a superficial ideology from which protestant workers might be 
detached. In September 1920, the Socialist rightly noted how the shipyard expulsions had 
included thousands of protestant socialists and trade unionists. It condemned the ‘Carson 
Clique’ for fomenting this violence in order to protect their class interests. As for those who 
carried out the attacks, they were dismissed as ‘Orange fanatics’ and the ‘worst product 
civilisation has known’72. A slightly more developed view of unionism was offered a year 
later by the CPGB’s Willie Paul. In his pamphlet, The Irish Crisis, he pointed out how the 
economic interests of the northern bourgeoisie were ‘intertwined’ with those of the British 
capitalism generally, and how this bourgeoisie was reliant for its continued prosperity on 
unfettered access to imperial markets.73 But the materialism stopped there. The rest of 
Paul’s argument constituted something of a flight both from Connolly, and reality.  He 
predicted that during a ‘revolutionary crisis’ the ‘peculiar psychology of Orangeism’ with its 
‘fierce and violent hatred’ of its enemies’ might result in protestant workers turning against 
the unionist bourgeoisie and moving towards socialism. 74 To say that this was wishful 
thinking is perhaps an understatement. But throughout this entire period, the possibility 
that a key section of the protestant working class might exist as a labour aristocracy and 
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consider its marginal material privileges to be bound up with Unionism was never 
interrogated by any section of the British Left. 
 
Communists, the Treaty and the Irish Civil War 
By 1921, the CPGB had become the dominant British Marxist organisation. Launched in 
August 1920, it was composed mainly of the BSP, along with sprinklings of other smaller 
groups.  Other developments were also taking place. In the aftermath of the Russian 
Revolution, a new Communist International had been formed, which identified the national 
and colonial question as a subject of prime importance. As indicated above, Lenin’s 
Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism had signposted this development. Flowing from 
his analysis was the view that the world had been divided into a small number of oppressor 
states and a large number of oppressed countries. For the first time, this brought the focus 
of European socialism onto those oppressed countries, which were now seen as important 
to the prospects of destroying capitalism globally. At the 1920 Comintern Congress, the 
national and colonial question was examined in depth. Distinctions were drawn between 
reactionary and progressive forms of nationalism and a set of theses drawn up which 
committed communists from imperial states to actively support revolutionary nationalist 
movements in colonies.75 
 
 In relation to Ireland, this suggested that British communists should offer active support for 
the struggle of the IRA against the British state. As if to clarify what was actually meant –and 
not meant--by this, Karl Radek offered the following prescription:  
The International will not judge the British comrades by the articles they write in the Call and the 
Workers’ Dreadnought but by the number of comrades who are thrown in gaol for agitating in the 
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colonial countries. We would point out to the British comrades that it is their duty to help the Irish 
movement with all their strength, that it is their duty to agitate among British troops, that it is their 
duty to use all their resources to block the policy that the British transport and rail unions are at 
present pursuing of permitting troop transports to be shipped to Ireland. It is very easy at the 
moment to speak out in Britain against intervention in Russia, since even the bourgeois left is against 
it. It is harder for the British comrades to take up the cause of Irish independence and anti-militarist 
activity. We have a right to demand this difficult work of the British comrades.76 
 
The CPGB had in its ranks a number of theoreticians with an interest in Irish politics, but 
appeared reluctant to prioritise Ireland over Russia in this fashion. In his first comment on 
Ireland in the Communist, T.A. Jackson made it clear that this would not happen. He argued 
that while the Bolshevik forces were part of the ‘World Army of Proletarian Revolution’ the 
Irish question was at root a national question. With CPGB resources finite, the question ‘was 
one of degree and urgency and on the grounds of superior urgency alone we can justify our 
concentration on the Russian aspects of the struggle’.77 
The 1920 Comintern Congress was also significant because the Irish communists themselves 
had taken part. Their emergence would provide another ingredient to the revolutionary mix.  
Two delegates, Roddy Connolly and Éadhmonn MacAlpine, made the long journey to 
Petrograd and were involved in the discussions on the national and colonial question. They 
clearly saw in the theses a confirmation of their own strategy, which had been based around 
assisting Irish republicans in a clandestine fashion. 78 The Irish communists, however, would 
not enjoy a fruitful relationship with their British counterparts. Connolly appeared 
unimpressed with the British communists from the earliest point, and later reflected that 
their ‘mode of political life was far removed from anything like illegal or conspiratorial 
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activity.’ 79 In February 1921, whilst in Moscow, he submitted a report to the Comintern 
Executive (ECCI) which criticised the British communists for their alleged inactivity on the 
Irish question, noting that how, beyond the press articles, they had ‘taken very little interest 
in helping the Irish communists.’ In this report, Connolly held out the hope that a Liaison 
Committee of the two parties could be established, which would ‘strengthen the connection 
between them80 However, relations between Irish and British communists did not improve. 
In August 1921, the CPGB started an Irish  Workers’ Republic column in the Communist, 
which was originally penned by Connolly. At this time, the Irish communists were engaged in 
a final attempt to gain control of the SPI. In his articles, Connolly made caustic references to 
the leaders of the party, Tom Johnson and William O’Brien, who were also the two leading 
figures in the Irish Labour Party and trade union movement at this point.  Supporting 
communists and exposing the manifold shortcomings of social democracy was a basic 
founding principle of the Third International, but rather than support Connolly against the 
Irish social democrats, the CPGB, irked by the tone of his remarks, decided to remove him as 
a contributor, commenting  that they had ‘neither preference nor choice’ between these 
‘rival personalities’ . 81  It is true that some of Connolly’s remarks verged on the juvenile but 
this was still an unprincipled approach by the CPGB and opened up a breach that would 
never be properly healed.   
In the subsequent period, British communists would develop little by way of a formal 
relationship with the CPI, preferring to cultivate links with republicans and Labour activists. 
With a Truce agreed between the republican leaders and the British state in July 1921, the 
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political climate in Ireland became more settled, allowing for connections to be 
strengthened between the CPGB and some leading republicans. In November 1921, T.A. 
Jackson visited Dublin and also met with the leaders of a number of other organisations, 
including the ITGWU, ICA, as well as the local communists.82 However, Jackson and the 
CPGB’s actual understanding of the Irish Revolution, specifically the relationship between 
Irish republicanism and socialism, lacked the clarity of the work that had been published by 
Seán McLoughlin in particular in the Socialist and appeared uncertain and inconsistent. For 
example, in April, he argued that socialists should support Irish independence because it 
would pave the way for socialism. He contended that whilst an Irish republic would not be 
socialist, it was a necessary step towards the Irish working class ‘freeing itself from the need 
to subordinate their class interests to the cause of national unity.’83 It was an analysis 
dismissed as  ‘Menshevist’  by his fellow CPGB member, P.L Gray, who argued that it would 
be a mistake to offer uncritical support to an Irish capitalist republic and how in their 
propaganda, British communists needed to highlight the dangers of nationalism and 
reinforce how the ‘Cause of  Dublin Castle was the Cause of the British Capitalists’. 84 
 
The main focus remained the negotiations between republican leaders and the British state. 
In December 1921 this eventually produced a Treaty that established a 26 county Irish Free 
State within the British Empire, and also copper-fastened partition. According to his own 
accounts, Willie Gallacher was tipped off about the agreement and travelled to Dublin, 
where he advised republicans to oppose the Treaty, arrest the plenipotentiaries who had 
signed it and issue a proclamation with some CPGB-inspired social policies. Gallacher was 
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welcomed as a friend by Cathal Brugha, Liam Mellows and Rory O’Connor, but—not 
surprisingly—his suggestions were politely declined. 85  The CPGB itself had expected that 
the talks might break down on the issue of the oath, and appeared surprised by the Treaty. 
Uncertainty characterised its early attempts at analysis.  In his first post-Treaty deliberation, 
Jackson criticised the British government for refusing to allow an Irish republic and for 
continuing to support unionism. The British had, he argued ‘gained much and lost 
little...except their dignity and honour’. His article, however, said little about the Treaty 
itself, or the class interests that it seemed to uphold, beyond the somewhat vague 
observation that Irish workers would be ‘disappointed’ by it.86 The contrast with the CPI 
position was striking. The Irish communists clearly believed that the class divides within the 
nationalist struggle, which the Sinn Féin leaders had attempted to conceal, had now been 
blown open. On the same day of the Jackson article, the Irish communist newspaper  
offered a withering class analysis, which depicted Michael Collins as an ‘imperialist careerist’ 
and forecast ‘civil war and social hell’ should the agreement be ratified.87  
 
In the following week’s edition, Jackson displayed again that he was out of touch with Irish 
communist thinking, when he stated that while nobody pretended to like the Treaty wholly, 
‘nobody denied that in its substance it represented a gain on 1914’. Jackson continued that 
‘those who should be qualified to judge’ had no faith in the ability of republicans to 
maintain a military struggle. He indicated that an economic revival as a result of peace might 
take place, and that this would open up class differences and the emergence of a 
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proletarian party.88 Much of this was at odds with the position of the CPI, who even at this 
early stage were now predicting and preparing for civil war. However, one week later, the 
CPGB executive released a statement which displayed a substantial shift towards the Irish 
communist position. Here, the Treaty was redefined as an agreement forced upon Ireland 
by British imperialism and designed to safeguard Britain’s imperialist interests.  The 
statement made clear that the CPGB associated itself with the Communist Party of Ireland 
analysis ‘in its refusal to recognise this Treaty as anything but the death-knell of the Irish 
Republic.’89   
 
Clearly then, the CPGB position on the Treaty had been confused and diffident. The strident 
analysis later praised by Reed and Bell emerged only after the party was shunted into line 
with the CPI position. In April 1922, the political picture in Ireland seemed to become 
clearer, if more tense, when a section of the IRA, which included socialist republicans Liam 
Mellows and Peadar O’Donnell, seized the Four Courts in Dublin. As well as being the centre 
of the Free State’s judicial system, the takeover had an obvious symbolism, in that it had 
previously been occupied by republicans during the Rising. Around the same time, CPI 
leader Connolly travelled to Germany in an attempt to regularise relations between the Irish 
communists and the ECCI. His communications here also offer more insights into Irish 
communist relations with their British comrades. In his report, Connolly continued to 
complain that the CPGB had been of no assistance to the CPI or the Irish revolutionary 
struggle. ‘They have helped us in no way financially, materially, morally’, he pointed out, 
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‘despite all the theses they...do not help our press, carry out no propaganda among British 
soldiers in Ireland’. 90 
 
The eventual outbreak of Civil War in June 1922 created a political environment fraught 
with danger for the communists. The context in which it occurred, where neither the 
Treatyites nor anti-Treatyites had made much reference to social or economic issues, served 
to confuse and divide workers. By any normal standards, this was not conducive to the 
development of working class politics. But the communists did not see it like that. On the 
contrary, as a result of the bourgeois class forces that it considered stacked up behind the 
Free State regime, the CPI saw in the Civil War a historic opportunity to build up its political 
strength. It believed that the anti-Treaty republicans might be persuaded to shift to the Left, 
in order to garner the support of the working class for the Republic. The ECCI shared this 
view and in the aftermath of the outbreak of conflict, it intervened. ECCI representative, 
Mikhail Borodin, was dispatched to London. On 14 July he had a meeting with the leaders of 
both the British and Irish communist parties and on 15 July interviewed the Irish leaders 
separately. 91 The purpose of these meetings was to review the situation in Ireland ‘with a 
view to working out a programme to embrace the various groups and classes that make up 
the Irish people.’ 92 The outcome of this in the immediate term was a 10-point socialist 
programme, which Roddy Connolly and Seán McLoughlin presented to anti-Treaty IRA 
leaders a week later in Fermoy, County Cork. 93 According to Connolly, Lynch was 
sympathetic, but outlined the primacy of the military struggle. A second outcome of this 
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meeting was the establishment of more formal relations between the two parties. CPI 
official, George Pollock stayed in London, to help out with the production of the Workers’ 
Republic paper, which was banned in Ireland. A room in King St was rented from the CPGB 
to assist with this task. 
 
Over the next few months, the communists made strenuous efforts to influence and assist 
the IRA. Seán McLoughlin rejoined the IRA and led a flying column in Limerick. Connolly 
travelled to Germany in an unsuccessful attempt to secure an arms deal for the republicans. 
The CPGB also did its best to influence the IRA directly. In September, McManus and JT 
Murphy travelled to Dublin to meet with the IRA leadership. There, they presented the 
republican leaders with a social programme similar to that drawn up earlier by Connolly and 
McLoughlin. The CPGB leaders reported the response as ‘excellent’ and stated that many 
republicans were willing to support communism.  An agreement was signed between the 2 
delegations, pending acceptance by their respective executives. The subsequent CPGB 
perspective was optimistic in the extreme: 
If by every possible means, military, economic, political, help can be rendered the IRA by the 
communist movement, thus demonstrating by deed the fundamental unity of purpose in their 
movement and the struggle towards communism, the future of the republican forces is one with 
ours.94  
 
Pollock may have accompanied the British communists on this trip. In 1948, he recalled a 
1922 meeting with two British communists and IRA leaders. Pollock insisted that at this 
meeting the proposition was put to the IRA that they popularise the social programme and 
establish a provisional government in the south. He claimed that IRA Quartermaster, Tom 
Derrig, whilst repeating the line about the importance of the military struggle, nonetheless 
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suggested that the communists go ahead and set up such a government, ‘promising that it 
would have the support and protection of the IRA.95 However, despite the optimism of the 
communists, the Civil War was proving disastrous for the IRA. The Free State took control of 
Dublin after one week of heavy fighting and by mid-August had dislodged the republicans 
from their remaining strongholds further south. From that point onwards the IRA was forced 
into a guerrilla campaign, which although partly successful against the British, was unlikely 
to prevail in the zero-sum battle context of civil war. By October, the tide was flowing 
strongly in the direction of the Free State. Feeling that it was now possible to strangle IRA 
resistance completely, the regime announced the establishment of military courts with the 
power to pass death sentences. In November 1922, the executions began. 
 
In October, a delegation of seven CPI members attended a CPGB conference at Battersea 
Town Hall. Their aim was to secure a greater level of support and involvement from the 
British party. At the conference, a resolution was passed, which ‘heartily agreed’ with the 
analysis and strategy of the CPI. This of course was based on continued communist 
involvement in and support for the anti-Treaty IRA. Whatever about the sagacity of such a 
policy, the CPGB support of the CPI position did suggest a more positive state of affairs 
between the two parties. However, it was a facade. Underneath, the relationship was close 
to breaking point. McManus and Murphy were now of the view that the only obstacle to the 
recruitment of left-wing Irish republicans and labour activists to communism was the 
chaotic CPI itself.96  On the other hand, the Irish communists remained dissatisfied with the 
British party, claiming that all they were getting by way of help were ‘pious resolutions.’ 
Connolly spoke at Battersea and in his speech appealed to British communists for assistance 
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in the propaganda work against the Free State and ‘imperial England’. 97 In response, the 
CPGB committed itself to the creation of ‘Hands off Ireland’ committees, which were 
designed to prevent the transport of war material to the Free State. 98 Later, there was also 
talk by the CPGB of organising a freeze on exports to the Free State.99 This was very much 
the type of activity the Comintern wished to see from British communists, but the 
commitment appeared to be purely verbal. No ‘Hands off Ireland’ activity took place and no 
freeze on exports to the Free State was attempted. The CPGB would be later criticised by 
Moscow for its lack of input into the Irish revolution.100 But by that stage, the CPI, and 
indeed the Irish Revolution itself, would have long passed into history. 
 
The remainder of the story of British communism and the Irish revolution is an unhappy 
one. Relations between the CPI and CPGB worsened. The IRA was effectively defeated by 
December 1922 and although the Civil War would continue into April 1923, its outcome was 
not in doubt. The CPI, small, never particularly stable, and unable to speak with just one 
voice on what constituted the appropriate level of communist involvement in the republican 
struggle, toiled in this difficult environment.  The party became more divided in the 
aftermath of the 1922 Comintern Congress, following a shift in strategy by the ECCI, which 
encouraged communists to withdraw from active involvement in the IRA and offer only 
‘moral support’ to republicans.101 One casualty of this division was Connolly, who lost his 
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leadership of the party, being temporarily replaced by former CPGB activist, ABF White. 102 
White had no experience of Irish politics and her installation as leader could only have come 
through CPGB pressure. Throughout this period, the CPGB played an unfortunate role in 
deepening the crisis of the CPI, setting itself up as an adjudicator on the precise definition of 
‘moral support’ and dispatching Tom Bell to the reconvened CPI conference in February 
1923 to ensure that the Irish communists accepted this definition.103 By the end of 1923, the 
CPGB was in cahoots with the recently-returned Jim Larkin, clearing the way for the final 
dissolution of the CPI. But by this stage, the Irish Revolution was long gone. Republicanism 
had been battered to defeat and the Left had been vanquished.  British communists would 
be involved for a period thereafter in the attempt to build an alternative to Free State neo-




On the eve of his execution in May 1916, James Connolly had an emotive final meeting with 
his wife Lillie and eldest daughter, Nora. During the visit, Connolly, reflecting on his actions, 
and what he knew to be the outlook of the British Left, asked Nora if she had seen any of 
the socialist newspapers. When Nora replied that she had not, Connolly retorted ‘They will 
never understand why I’m here...they will all forget I am an Irishman’. 104 As we have seen, 
these would prove to be prophetic words, because in 1916, very few socialists did 
understand why James Connolly had ended up in the GPO. Most saw the Rising as a 
nationalist rebellion, an act of militarism, which could not serve working class interests.  
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Attitudes would change. Throughout much of the ensuing Irish revolutionary period, British 
socialists would become more aware of the reasons behind Connolly’s actions in 1916, more 
able to distinguish between reactionary bourgeois nationalism and revolutionary anti-
imperialism, more understanding of the connections that existed between revolution in the 
colonies and socialism in the metropolitan states themselves. But how should their efforts 
be judged and what legacy, if any, did it create? 
 
1916 can be seen as a low point for British socialism in its understanding of the realities of 
Irish revolutionary politics. Marx and Engels may well have offered a theoretical and 
practical guide to the Irish national question for British socialists, but it is clear that in 1916, 
the British Left’s response owed more to the ideas and thinking of the Second 
International—the same International that in 1907 had debated  the merits and demerits of 
a ‘socialist colonial policy’105 and the same brand of socialism that in 1914 would watch on, 
and in many instances cheer, as the European working class marched to the killing fields of 
France and Belgium. The need for a more penetrating analysis of the relationship between 
nationalism and socialism in colonial states, and the notion that the political terrain of a 
colonial state differed to that of a colonising state, and required a different response from 
socialists, was not widely understood or accepted by European socialists in this era—and 
certainly not by most British socialists. 
 
The violence of the British state and its decision to meet a popular movement for Irish 
freedom with force and repression eventually brought about a change in the attitudes of 
the British Left. The global context was also different by the stage. The first successful 
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socialist revolution had taken place. Coupled with this was a developing understanding of 
the importance of the national and colonial questions.  This led to greater emphasis on the 
Irish independence struggle, and greater support for it. During the War of Independence, 
the most significant organisation was the SLP. Unlike other groupings, the SLP forged direct 
links with sections of the Irish revolutionary movement.  The party based its support for Irish 
freedom on materialist grounds and appeared more aware of the connection between the 
anti-imperialist struggle in Ireland and the struggle for socialism in Britain. A similar 
approach was also in evidence from John Maclean and his small band of revolutionary 
socialists in Glasgow. But In both instances, the organisation was weak, and the influence 
was limited. The SLP was finished by 1922 and Maclean would be dead by 1923. 
 
The responsibility for organising British revolutionary socialism’s involvement in the Irish 
Revolution passed to the CPGB. The organisation had in its ranks a number of leading 
activists and theoreticians with a long-standing interest in Irish revolutionary politics. The 
CPGB was small by international communist standards, but still had a membership of 
around 12,000—which made it several times larger than that of the combined forces of the 
SLP and Maclean. Moreover, it could also draw on the support and resources of the 
Communist International, which had identified a successful Irish anti-imperialist struggle as 
central to one of its most important strategic aims--the weakening of the global power of 
British imperialism.  
 
However, the CPGB would have a more restricted input into the Irish revolution. The 
organisation did produce propaganda and attempted to build a rationale for socialist 
support of the Irish independence struggle. The CPGB also made connections with some 
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Irish republican leaders and were treated with consideration by them, even if their 
communist prescriptions were gently ignored.  On the other hand, the CPGB did not make 
any attempt to organise Hands off Ireland activity. Neither did it adopt a policy of agitating 
among British troops. As we have seen, there were isolated instances of British socialists 
taking part in such activity. But these tended to be individuals with no connection to the 
CPGB. If the British communist contribution to the Irish revolution was to be measured by 
the number of British communists gaoled for such activity, then the judgement would be a 
harsh one indeed.  
 
The Russian connection was an undoubted source of strength to British and Irish 
communists, but also accentuated the problems between them. The ECCI expected the 
CPGB to exercise a fostering role over the CPI. The negative implications of such a 
relationship had been spelled out 50 years earlier by Engels. All too often, the CPGB acted 
with a paternalistic arrogance. There is no doubt that the Irish communists were weak and 
ineffective, but when it came to analysis of the political situation in Ireland, they were 
streets ahead of their British counterparts. The fact that the CPGB had to step into line with 
the CPI analysis of the Treaty is perhaps the best example of this. The British communists 
seemed unable to analyse the class basis of Irish republicanism, or the relationship between 
Irish republicanism and socialism, in any consistent, coherent fashion. But despite this, the 
CPGB continued in its attempts to dictate Irish policy. In 1923, this would reach the heights 
of instructing the Irish communists—12 of whom were either in prison or had been 
imprisoned-- the degree to which they should be involved in a republican struggle that had 




How then should the efforts of British socialists be considered?  There is no doubt that the 
centuries-long tradition of support for Irish freedom by British radicals was further 
enhanced and developed by British socialists during the Irish Revolution.  Moreover, this 
tradition was transformed into a wider appreciation of the need to oppose imperialism 
more generally. This particular tradition has informed and contextualised some aspects of 
British socialist activity in the decades that have passed, not simply in relation to Ireland, but 
further afield. It was perhaps most recently in evidence in the 2-million strong march against 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003. But to return to Connolly’s comment.  After 1916, British 
socialists did develop a greater understanding of the republican struggle in Ireland. They 
certainly had more awareness of its importance. They knew it could not be ignored and 
needed to be supported. But for many, it still remained an issue of secondary importance. It 
was all too often a struggle not seen as vital to, or even connected to, their own, more 
important in their eyes, struggle for revolutionary change in Britain. 
